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Introduction
Perspectives on Science and Culture
Kris Rutten, Stefaan Blancke, and Ronald Soetaert
This edited volume in the Comparative Cultural Studies Series explores the 
intersection between scientific understanding and cultural representation from 
an interdisciplinary perspective. The contributions in this volume analyze pop-
ular representations of science and scientific discourse from the perspectives of 
rhetorical criticism, comparative cultural studies, narratology, educational stud-
ies, discourse analysis, the cognitive sciences, and naturalized and evolutionary 
epistemology. As such, the volume fits within the theoretical and methodolog-
ical framework of comparative cultural studies as a contextual approach to the 
study of culture from an interdisciplinary perspective. The main objective of 
this volume is to explore how particular cognitive predispositions and cultural 
representations both shape and distort the public debate about scientific con-
troversies, the teaching and learning of science, and the development of science 
itself. Theoretically, this volume will integrate, on the one hand, C. P. Snow’s 
concept of the two cultures (science versus the humanities) and Jerome Bruner’s 
confrontation between narrative and logico-scientific modes of thinking and, on 
the other hand, cognitive and epistemological approaches to human cognition 
and culture, including science.
From this unique conciliatory framework, the volume explores how narra-
tives and other cultural representations transform complex scientific issues into 
digestible bits of information based on particular selections and deflections. 
Some of the contributions analyze how scientific representations and metaphors 
of science take shape in pictures, cartoons, and television broadcasts, but also 
in novels and popular magazines. Others specifically focus on the implications 
of these representations and (mis)understandings for science education, both in 
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formal and informal educational settings. Thematically, the contributions focus 
on a wide range of current debates about evolutionary theory, global warming, 
genetic modification, and so on. As such, it indirectly engages with discussions 
pertaining to the politics of science. The aim of this volume is to engage in the 
ongoing debate about the public understanding of science and is original in its 
interdisciplinary scope, ranging from philosophy, cognitive psychology, anthro-
pology, and biology to literature, cultural studies, and rhetoric.
Public Understanding of Science
There has been increasing attention on the valorization of scientific research, in 
combination with a growing public debate about the uses and applications of sci-
entific findings for social and economic purposes (Benneworth and Jongbloed). 
Media coverage of scientific findings plays an important role in shaping the 
public understanding of science and as such creates a context for socio-ethical 
debates about the application and development of scientific research (van Dijck). 
However, the communication of science is always, inevitably partial and this 
partiality raises issues of authority, creates potential misunderstandings, and 
complicates the public debate about science (Tietge). One of the main aims of 
science communication and programs aimed at increasing scientific literacy is to 
create a better public understanding of science and to emphasize its wider rele-
vance to society (Gross, “Roles”).
Science communication often consists of a one-way flow from scientists to 
the general public by accommodating scientific findings to a nonexpert audience. 
Such a unilateral approach is indeed important for transferring relevant scientific 
knowledge to society but runs the risk of disregarding the contexts that give sci-
ence its public significance and the ambiguities that arise from particular framings 
in the public debate (Gross, “Roles” and Rhetoric). Public concerns and opinions 
from stakeholders are often seen as (unwarranted) anxieties or vested interests 
rather than “assets” that have a role to play in the debate about scientific develop-
ments and applications (Bauer; Bauer, Shukla and Allum). There is an entangled 
and reciprocal relationship between science and society and therefore there is a 
need for a better understanding of the accommodation of scientific findings from 
experts to lay audiences, for an understanding of the different positions in the sci-
entific and the public debate, and for an integration of scientific developments and 
the needs of society (Fahnestock; Gross, “Roles” and Rhetoric; Tietge, Rational).
For example, there is an ongoing body of research on the public under-
standing of genetics. Although there have been vast scientific advances in DNA 
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technology, the socio-ethical and the legal and political debates still remain very 
contested and ambivalent. In her seminal work, Imagenation, José van Dijck has 
shown that the public imagination of genetics has undergone an important trans-
formation during the decades that this branch of scientific research took shape, 
as the synopsis of her book notes: “From news stories of DNA strings escaping 
from our laboratories to the ongoing debates over bioethics, from James Watson 
and The Double Helix to the Human Genome Project, Van Dijck portrays the 
‘imaginary’ tools of genetics as players in a theater of representation — a multi-
layered contest in which special interest groups and professional organizations 
mobilize images in a heated debate over the meaning of genetics” (van Dijck). 
Popular representations of genetics do not necessarily reflect the advancement of 
genetic technology but these cultural accounts offer the repertoires and images 
with which different stakeholders debate the social, legal, political, and moral 
issues related to genetics research.
Rhetoric of Science
In this volume, rhetoric is introduced as one of the approaches to studying the 
public understanding of science. Rhetoric is the study and practice of persua-
sion. Scientists are inevitably engaged in the process of persuasion both within 
the academic community and outside, in public forums which need to be con-
sidered as different rhetorical situations (Simons; Harris; Journet). The focus 
of “new rhetoric” has expanded to many discursive domains, including science. 
There is a growing body of work on the rhetoric of science (Gross, “Roles” and 
Rhetoric; Gaonkar, “Idea”; Fahnestock; Harris; Simons), which focuses on the 
rhetoric of the scientific article (Gross et al.), the role of metaphors in the com-
munication of science (Journet), the popularization of science (Tietge), and 
the critical assessment of emerging technologies (Zappen). As Alan Gross has 
argued, “The rhetorical view of science does not deny ‘the brute facts of nature’; 
it merely affirms that these ‘facts,’ whatever they are, are not science itself . . . 
Whatever they are, the ‘brute facts’ themselves mean nothing; only statements 
have meaning, and of the truth of statements we must be persuaded. These pro-
cesses, by which problems are chosen and results interpreted, are essentially 
rhetorical: only through persuasion are importance and meaning established” 
(Gross, Rhetoric 4).
The application of rhetorical studies to science has also been used to analyze 
the discourse of popular culture and how it relates to complex social phenom-
ena such as the proliferation of pseudoscience (Gunn) or antipsychiatry (Rutten 
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et al.). The rhetoric of science studies how scientists — as part of a discursive 
community — frame and communicate their knowledge, what they argue 
about and how, how scientists present their findings, and what genres, formats, 
and media they use to communicate those findings (Ornatowski). Despite 
the growing body of scholarship on the rhetoric of science, there is a need for 
further development of rhetoric as a framework for the public understanding 
of science, specifically given the increasingly mediatized public debate in an 
expert-dominated society (Fahnestock; van Dijck). A rhetorical approach to 
scientific discourse studies how particular framings of scientific findings and 
developments influence the socio-ethical debate, how this relates to science pol-
icy, and how an awareness of the rhetorical dimensions of science is important 
for scientific as well as nonscientific audiences and what the educational dimen-
sions are of such a rhetor ical awareness.
Two Cultures
In this volume, we also discuss the ongoing confrontation between science and 
the humanities by focusing on C. P. Snow’s concept of the two cultures (and the 
so-called science wars) and Jerome Bruner’s confrontation between narrative and 
logico-scientific modes of thinking. The concept of the “two cultures” refers to 
C. P. Snow’s famous 1959 essay in which he problematized the gap between liter-
ary intellectuals and scientists. Until today, the concept has survived as a trope to 
frame the debate between the humanities and science. The notion of the two cul-
tures was also central in the work of the educational psychologist Jerome Bruner, 
who confronted two modes of thought, two modes of cognitive functioning, 
each rendering different and distinctive ways of constructing reality and order-
ing experience: the logico-scientific mode and the narrative mode. For Bruner, 
these two modes are complementary though irreducible to each other and both 
have different operating principles, different criteria of well-formedness and dif-
ferent procedures for verification. The main difference is that logico-scientific 
arguments need to convince by applying procedures for establishing formal and 
empirical proof, and that narratives can convince of their lifelikeness by verisi-
militude (Rutten; Rutten and Soetaert).
The logico-scientific mode of thinking focuses on general and empirically 
tested truths, and the knowledge that it produces should not be contradic-
tory. The narrative mode, on the other hand, focuses on the intentionality of 
human actions (what and why?) and the context in which these actions took 
place (where and when?). From the narrative perspective, truth is approached 
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as situated or contextual. Indeed, as Bruner states, “the imaginative application 
of the paradigmatic mode leads to good theory, tight analysis, logical proof and 
empirical discovery guided by reasoned hypothesis. . . . The imaginative applica-
tion of the narrative mode leads instead to good stories, gripping drama, [and] 
believable (though not necessarily ‘true’) historical accounts” (13; also qtd. in 
Rutten and Stoetaert). It is not the aim in this volume to evaluate the differ-
ence between these two modes of thought. Indeed, Bruner himself has already 
pointed out the problematic aspect of this strict distinction between two modes 
of cognitive functioning (for an extended discussion of these two modes see 
Rutten; Rutten and Soetaert). However, based on Bruner’s theory of narrative 
as a specific mode of knowing, the aim is, among others, to study what can be 
learned from narratives and to explore how narratives can be used as tools to 
thematize and problematize the distinction between the two cultures.
Cognitive Science
Besides rhetorical and narrative approaches to the study of science and culture, 
this volume will also introduce perspectives from cognitive science. Cognitive 
science comprises several disciplines such as artificial intelligence, psychology, 
and philosophy that treat the mind as an information-processing organ. Decades 
of research have made it clear that the mind can only perform that function if it 
holds particular expectations about the world. If it did not, the mind would be 
absolutely clueless as to which information to attend to and how to handle it. 
An important category of such expectations is “intuitive ontologies,” which are 
spontaneous assumptions and inferences about the causal structure of particu-
lar domains of reality (Boyer). For example, folk physics deals with inanimate 
objects, folk biology is concerned with the living world, and folk psychology 
guides our inferences about agents. These intuitions work fast, automatically, and 
under the radar of conscious awareness, but they do exert an important influence 
on the beliefs we hold reflectively, both at the individual and at the cultural level.
The epidemiology of representations, developed by cognitive anthropologist 
Dan Sperber, explains how the susceptibilities of the human mind shape and 
constrain the formation and distribution of beliefs. Ceteris paribus, the represen-
tations that tap into our intuitive expectations stand a better chance of grabbing 
attention, being remembered, and transmitted. Played out over multiple trans-
missions, these representations will become the most popular within a particular 
population. In other words, they will become cultural. Intuitive ontologies, too, 
fix a lot of cultural content as they affect our beliefs about the world around us. 
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These beliefs might be intuitively appealing but they are usually not scientifically 
accurate. Creationist stories, for instance, tap into our folk biology and psychol-
ogy, but hardly provide an adequate explanation for the origin and the diversity 
of species (Blancke and De Smedt).
For that reason, a proper understanding of human cognition in general 
and intuitive ontologies in particular is essential for the study, understand-
ing, and improvement of science education, the public understanding of science, 
and even science itself. The minds of students and lay people are not blank slates 
that can simply be inscribed with any input. Instead, they come equipped with 
naive conceptions of the world, which constitute formidable cognitive obstacles 
for teachers and popularizers to overcome (Shtulman). Recently, much research 
in cognitive and developmental psychology, philosophy, and the history of sci-
ence has been done on how intuitive ontologies make possible and thus influence 
the development, understanding, and acceptance of scientific theories and con-
cepts (Carey and Spelke; Carruthers et al.; Evans et al.; Heintz; Nersessian). This 
volume aims to make a contribution to this literature and tease out the implica-
tions for the development, teaching, and understanding of science.
Naturalized, Social, and Evolutionary Epistemology
The philosophical tradition of naturalized epistemology takes seriously the 
insights from the cognitive sciences to understand the processes of knowledge 
generation and acquisition. As evolved biological creatures, humans have only 
limited cognitive and sensory abilities. In order to overcome these limitations 
and to develop and sustain counterintuitive scientific concepts, scientists rely 
on all sorts of help such as observational tools (e.g., telescopes), conceptual tools 
(e.g., analogies), and reasoning tools (e.g., logics). For that reason, philosopher 
Susan Haack describes science as common sense, but “more so” (101). One 
important scaffold is criticism by others. It is natural for us to look for argu-
ments and facts that confirm rather than contradict our position. Hence, to have 
our views corrected, it is crucial that we submit them to the critical eye of our 
peers, who are similarly predisposed to defend their own ideas, but who are very 
happy to detect any errors in the beliefs and arguments of others (Mercier and 
Heintz). Science is thus necessarily and inherently social. To understand how sci-
ence works, therefore, one needs to investigate how the social dimension adds to 
the development of scientific knowledge. This is the domain of social epistemol-
ogy, to which rhetorical, historical, and sociological studies of science have made 
important contributions. These studies have clearly demonstrated that scientific 
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insights do not result from rigidly applying the scientific method, but emerge 
from the interactions among fallible human beings. However, in contrast to pop-
ular postmodernist and relativist interpretations, the social character does not 
infringe upon, but rather results in and corroborates science’s epistemic strength 
(Goldman; Haack; Longino).
Evolutionary epistemology is the strand of naturalized epistemology that 
focuses on the evolutionary dimensions of knowledge generation. This philo-
sophical project comes in various shapes. Evolutionary epistemologists such as 
Donald Campbell, Karl Popper, and David Hull have argued that science pro-
ceeds in ways analogous to biological evolution. Various hypotheses provide the 
variation from which the ideas and beliefs that best fit the world are selected and 
retained. Recently, however, the focus has shifted to the study of the implications 
of evolutionary approaches to the human mind for our understanding of science. 
How do our evolved abilities and constraints affect the course of science? More 
broadly, the term “evolutionary” also refers to a populational view that aims at 
explaining the distribution and stability of particular beliefs and ideas within 
the scientific culture. An epidemiology of representations enables us to identify 
and map the various causal factors, including our evolved abilities and the specif-
ics (e.g., institutions, social arrangements, artifacts) of the environment that the 
minds of scientists engage with. As such, an epidemiological approach opens the 
way towards the integration of the various studies of science, and consequently, 
of the humanities, social sciences, and biological sciences (Heintz).
Consilience
Because of its interdisciplinary scope, this volume underwrites the reconciliation 
of rhetorical, narrative, cognitive, and epistemological perspectives — although 
some of the contributing authors are still skeptical. Whereas the rhetoric of sci-
ence investigates which communication tools and strategies scientists deploy to 
convince others, cognitive science helps to shed light on why scientists use these 
particular tools and strategies and not others and why some, but not others, are 
successful. More fundamentally, a cognitive approach also helps to explain why 
arguments play such an important role in science, science communication, and 
education: they are constitutive of human reasoning — that is, of providing (con-
vincing) reasons to persuade someone else of one’s views (Mercier and Sperber; 
Sperber and Mercier).
Cognitive science also makes a valuable contribution to the debates about 
the two cultures in the sense that it puts doubt on the existence of a sharp 
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boundary between the two. Cognitive approaches to science assume that scien-
tific thinking builds on ordinary cognition. Hence, there is no essential property, 
no silver bullet by which one could distinguish scientific from so-called other 
ways of reasoning. Scientists, too, rely on narrative thinking and other intuitive 
means of reasoning to develop their counterintuitive theories. This is not to deny 
that scientific cultures differ from other kind of cultures — science has its own 
institutions, organizations, procedures, and so on — but a cognitive approach 
implies that the difference will not be as clear-cut as the traditional two-culture 
approach suggests. An epistemological project that integrates the cognitive and 
cultural dimensions will enable us to develop a fine-grained understanding of the 
various scientific cultures, how they generate knowledge, and the similarities and 
differences between them. At the same time, it helps to explain what happens to 
scientific concepts outside these cultures, when transmitted to the larger public 
via (popular) science communication and education.
Contributions
In part 1, “Narrative and Rhetorical Perspectives,” the volume brings together 
new work on the public understanding of science from the perspective of liter-
ature, narratology, cultural studies, anthropology, and rhetoric. In his chapter, 
“Experiencing Nature through Cable Television,” David J. Tietge explores the 
relationship between cable television representations of nature and biology and 
how they influence the public understanding of environmental networks. The 
author argues that the metaphors, delivery, content, and orientation of such pro-
gramming are guided by what Kenneth Burke calls an “occupational psychosis,” 
a collective orientation that mirrors the economic principles of the culture in 
which such “edutainment” has been produced. More specifically, he is interested 
in how cable nature programming frames nature entertainment as a commer-
cialized product that is to be consumed, capitalized on and expanded. According 
to Tietge, the anthropocentric nature programs discussed in his chapter start 
from the ideal that giving the audience what it wants — by relating to familiar 
ideological orientations such as war, conflict, and competition — is more profitable 
than representing nature from the traditional perspective of orthodox biological 
science. Representing nature as a product thus inevitably affects public attitudes 
about nature and the environment. In the final section, Tietge therefore argues 
that there is a need for a “rhetorical literacy” which would include “instruction 
on all educational levels in language structure; close critical readings of popular 
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texts, including cable nature programs; how logical arguments are constructed; 
what can be done with existing knowledge and how new knowledge can be made; 
and how people, agencies, corporations, and other institutions all have rhetorical 
reasons for presenting knowledge in a preordained way.”
In his contribution, “Steven Pinker and the Scientific Sublime: How a 
New Category of Experience Transformed Popular Science,” Alan G. Gross 
argues that although the rhetoric of science has become a vital subfield within 
rhetorical studies — a field within which he has been working for a long time 
already — the rhetoric of popular science has been largely ignored. Alan Gross 
has recently been working on a book project entitled The Scientific Sublime: How 
Popular Science Unravels the Mysteries of the Universe, in which he explores the 
popularization of science by (contemporary) scientists and science writers such 
as such as Steven Weinberg, Richard Feynman, Stephen Hawking, Richard 
Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould, Brian Green, Rachel Carson, and Lisa Randall. 
He focuses on their argumentative skills to persuade the general audience about 
how science can answer fundamental questions about the human being and 
the universe, amongst other topics. Gross argues that these authors employ an 
overarching rhetorical concept, the sublime, as a category of experience that 
generates a sense of wonder at the discoveries of science. In his contribution to 
this volume Gross starts from this larger project and develops a critical analysis 
of the work of Steven Pinker. The sublime, he claims in this chapter, is a persua-
sive resource that is being used by Pinker and other scientist-popularizers. The 
author argues that Pinker’s major works share a single overriding assumption: 
“science can be relied on to shed significant light on subjects far removed from 
the laboratory or the observatory and can astonish us by its revelations about 
language, about the mind, about human behavior generally, and about violence 
in particular.” Gross argues that the scientific sublime is invoked and evoked in 
each of these works.
Although this specific reading and analysis of the work of Pinker is of course 
open to debate and discussion (and the work of Pinker and the topics he explores 
in his popular books have been discussed from many different perspectives), it is 
an example of a critical assessment and analysis of the rhetoric of popular science 
and popular scientists. It also exemplifies the complexity of bringing scientific 
debates to a larger audience through popular science.
In his chapter, “Architectonic Discourses and their Extremisms,” Barry 
Brummett starts from the question: “What can humans know with some mea-
sure of confident certainty, and what can we know that must always be largely 
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contingent, exigent, and — in a word — arguable?” Taking Aristotle’s distinction 
between discourses that offer sure and certain systems to guide distinctions, and 
those discourses (primarily rhetoric and dialectic) that manage decisions that are 
contingent and uncertain, Brummett explores a range of discourses that have 
historically claimed to be architectonic, or ruling, discourses. The author claims 
that the extremism consists not in resorting to sure and certain systems to guide 
decisions, but instead in resorting to these systems to guide decisions that ought 
to be decided rhetorically. The extremism in architectonic discourses is illus-
trated in a brief analysis of a website opposing childhood vaccinations. Brumett 
argues that the search for an architectonic discourse is a natural human desire. 
However, his contribution can be read as a plea to take any architectonic dis-
course with a great deal of caution.
In his chapter, “Science and the Idea of Culture,” Richard van Oort 
argues that the conflict between the sciences and the humanities should not 
be understood in terms of the local “cultural” differences between scientists 
and humanists (C. P. Snow’s “two cultures”), but rather in terms of the more 
fundamental problem of language origin: “Is language an extension of animal 
communication systems, or is it something radically different? Is it explain-
able in purely Darwinian terms, or is it an evolutionary anomaly (i.e., without 
precedent in evolutionary history)?” Van Oort argues that when it comes to 
explaining culture, science inevitably presses up against its limits. The central 
paradox of culture, according to van Oort, is that culture depends upon biol-
ogy — “because culture requires brains and brains are the products of biological 
evolution” — but at the same time culture is also an institutional given. Van Oort 
starts by discussing the work of C. P. Snow, who criticized humanists for failing 
to take an interest in the work of their colleagues in the sciences and concurs that 
a genuine dialogue between humanists and scientists is rare. But van Oort argues 
that the problem of human origin (and specifically language origin) is one area 
in which dialogue seems both desirable and necessary, because it concerns both 
parties alike: “the sooner humanists recognize their stake in this fundamental 
question, the sooner they will be able to overcome their anxiety about the func-
tion of the humanities in a culture that privileges science as the only form of 
‘serious’ cognition.”
In their contribution, “A Rhetorical Analysis of the Two Cultures in 
Literary Fiction,” Ronald Soetaert and Kris Rutten reconstruct the debate 
between and about the “two cultures” from a rhetorical perspective (focusing 
on “science wars” and perspectives from the “third culture”). Science and liter-
ature are described as particular terministic screens and the binary oppositions 
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between these different “ways of seeing” are problematized. The major focus is 
on the importance of rhetoric and narrative in general and the role and function 
of the humanities — literary culture — in particular. The authors analyze two 
novels (Saturday and The Children Act) as a case study to reflect upon how the 
novelist Ian McEwan problematizes and thematizes the confrontation between 
art and science. They argue that McEwan participates in the debate about the 
two cultures with novels with essayistic ambitions on the one hand, but that he 
accommodates scientific facts and arguments into his prose on the other hand. 
The fact that these McEwan novels are vehicles that reflect upon the relation 
between art and science implies that he uses the novel as an allegory to discuss 
major social and cultural problems. The works of McEwan that are discussed 
in this chapter can be read as part of an ethical turn in literature and a revival 
of humanism in twenty-first century literature. Both novels reflect upon (and 
defend) traditional humanistic values in general and the function of literature 
in particular.
In his chapter, “The Missing Link and Human Origins: Understanding an 
Evolutionary Icon,” Peter C. Kjærgaard argues that in the history of evolution-
ary theory no single topic has attracted so much attention and caused so much 
public debate as the question of human origins. In the discussions following the 
discovery of hominin fossils in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries the idea of the missing link between humans and animals turned into what 
has historically become one of the most powerful icons of evolution. Until the 
mid-twentieth century, however, both adherents and critics of evolution hailed 
the missing link as a crucial proof of the correctness of the theory of human 
evolution. It continued to be a hot topic in public debates and as such a good 
selling point for popular science books equally exploited by journalists, profes-
sional science writers, and scientists. Despite the fact that the idea of a missing 
link as a necessary piece of evidence for human evolution bears no meaning in 
contemporary science, it is wrong to think that is has no relevance. The missing 
link’s lasting effects on public understanding of human evolution has made it far 
more than a mere cultural product and as such it continues to be a problem in 
public engagement. This chapter presents a brief history of the missing link as an 
evolutionary icon in popular and scientific contexts.
In part 2, “Cognitive Perspectives,” the contributions focus on how findings 
and insights from within the cognitive sciences can help us to understand and 
improve the public understanding of science. In her chapter, “Suspicion toward 
Science and the Role of Automatic Intuitions about Origins,” Elisa Järnefelt 
argues that skeptical public attitudes to evolutionary theory and climate change 
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are anchored in the intuition that nature has been purposefully created by a 
supernatural being. As people will not easily revise their intuitive beliefs about 
these issues, scientists face the enormous challenge of finding ways to override 
them when communicating with the public. She concludes with a couple of sug-
gestions in regards to science education and communication.
In her chapter, “Bridging the Gap: From Intuitive to Scientific Reason-
ing — The Case of Evolution,” Margaret Evans examines the use of intuitions to 
jump-start more sophisticated reasoning, as has been proposed for mathemat-
ics. The question addressed in this chapter is whether core intuitions can also 
jump-start biological reasoning. Intuitive ideas can offer an immediate action 
plan that allows us to make a rapid appraisal of the human mind or the natural 
world. Yet, there is a downside, such as a reliance on what may be inaccurate 
scientific judgments, based on cognitive predispositions such as anthropomor-
phic or essentialist reasoning. Studies conducted with museum visitors will be 
used to support the argument that specific cognitive predispositions can both 
help and hinder understanding. Margaret Evans argues that core intuitions can 
provide a series of stepping-stones, which, if navigated with care, may promote 
science learning.
The chapter by Andrew Shtulman, “Missing Links: How Cladograms 
Reify Common Evolutionary Misconceptions,” provides an excellent example 
of how thinking tools can enforce rather than override intuitive misconcep-
tions. Developed as a conceptual tool to understand common ancestry and 
phylogenetic relationships, cladograms also tend to strengthen several popular 
misconceptions about evolution. This chapter focuses not on what the clado-
grams represent, but on what they fail to represent: extinction, diversity, and 
variation. These omissions are unproblematic in a scientific concept but they lead 
people to miscomprehend these three important evolutionary concepts.
In the final chapter of this section, “Representations of the Origin of Species 
in Secular (France) and Religious (Morocco) Contexts,” Dominique Guillo 
reveals the complexity of people’s ideas concerning evolution. In France, people 
who claim to accept evolutionary theory hold views that in fact come very close 
to intelligent design, which they share with nonevolutionists in Morocco. This 
shows the perpetual influence of cognitive biases. However, Guillo also finds 
that people’s representations of the origin of species are often blurry and cannot 
be compared to the well thought out beliefs of evolutionary biologists. Instead of 
treating the blurriness as noise that needs to be removed to get at people’s true 
beliefs, scientists might better regard it as characteristic of people’s representa-
tions of the origin of species.
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In part 3, “Epistemological Perspectives,” we consider the epistemolog-
ical implications of the social and cognitive aspects of science. In his chapter, 
“Updating Evolutionary Epistemology,” Christophe Heintz considers Donald 
Campbell’s evolutionary epistemology and specifies why it is a worthwhile proj-
ect for explaining the evolution of science as a specific case of cultural evolution. 
However, he also criticizes Campbell’s evolutionary epistemology for assuming 
that blind variation and selective retention is the process through which science 
evolves. This assumption, the author argues, is at odds with much of what we 
know about scientific cognition and the history of science. Heintz therefore pro-
poses an updated research program for evolutionary epistemology, which faces 
new challenges.
The following chapter, “Intuition in Science Education and the Public 
Understanding of Science,” by Stefaan Blancke, Koen Tanghe, and Johan 
Braeckman, examines the role of intuition in science communication in general. 
They start from the double role intuition plays in science itself: as a cognitive bias 
it detracts scientists from finding out about the real world, but as a scaffold it is 
indispensible for the construction of highly counterintuitive scientific concepts 
and theories. This double role puts science communicators in a peculiar position. 
On the one hand they need to develop educational tools, practices, and strategies 
to avoid the pitfalls of our intuitive reasoning; on the other hand they need to 
appeal to the very same intuition to instill a scientific understanding in their 
audience. As a result, some approaches that seem promising at first may turn out 
to have the opposite effect.
In the final chapter, “Vindicating Science — By Bringing It Down,” Maarten 
Boudry and Massimo Pigliucci argue that there is no stark difference between the 
social and the rational. Nor is it the case that true beliefs are self-evident and that 
only flawed beliefs require a causal explanation. Instead, if we want to explain sci-
ence’s epistemic superiority, we need to take into account the factors that allow 
for and sustain the development of scientific beliefs, including the social.
Part 4 contains a thematic bibliography on narrative, rhetorical, cognitive, 
and epistemological perspectives on science and culture.
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